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In West Africa, health system funding rarely involves cross-subsidization among population segments. In
some countries, a few community-based or professional health insurance programs are present, but
coverage is very low. The ﬁnancial principles underlying universal health coverage (UHC) sustainability
and solidarity are threefold: 1) anticipation of potential health risks; 2) risk sharing and; 3) socio-economic
status solidarity. In Burkina Faso, where decision-makers are favorable to national health insurance, we
measured endorsement of these principles and discerned which management conﬁgurations would
achieve the greatest adherence.
We used a sequential exploratory design. In a qualitative step (9 interviews, 12 focus groups), we
adapted an instrument proposed by Goudge et al. (2012) to the local context and addressed desirability
bias. Then, in a quantitative step (1255 respondents from the general population), we measured
endorsement. Thematic analysis (qualitative) and logistic regressions (quantitative) were used.
High levels of endorsement were found for each principle. Actual practices showed that anticipation
and risk sharing were not only intentions. Preferences were given to solidarity between socio-economic
status (SES) levels and progressivity. Although respondents seemed to prefer the national level for
implementation, their current solidarity practices were mainly focused on close family. Thus, contri-
bution levels should be set so that the entire family beneﬁts from healthcare.
Some critical conditions must be met to make UHC ﬁnancial principles a reality through health in-
surance in Burkina Faso: trust, fair and mandatory contributions, and education.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Recently, numerous studies have been conducted, either to
understand the factors enabling certain low and middle income
countries (LMIC) to move closer to universal health coverage (UHC)
(Giedion et al., 2013; Lagomarsino et al., 2012; McIntyre et al., 2013;
McKee et al., 2013), or to measure and monitor their current levels
of UHC (The PLOS Medicine Editors, 2014). Nonetheless, extensive
work remains to be done on both the action and research fronts
(Horton and Das, 2014). The literature emphasizes how important it
is to take into account country-speciﬁc social and political contexts
when engaging in large-scale reforms (McKee et al., 2013; WHO,ool of Public Health, IRSPUM,
ille Station, Montreal, Quebec
de).
Ltd. This is an open access article u2013b) to “translate UHC into country-speciﬁc reality” (Kutzin,
2013, p. 608). Moreover, “[UHC] can be achieved in many different
ways. There is no single recipe” (Savedoff et al., 2012). Beyond the
well-known and outdated dichotomy between tax-based (Bever-
idge) and contribution-based (Bismark) models, each country se-
lects a path-dependent strategy adapted to their inherited health
system (The PLOS Medicine Editors, 2014). Regarding ﬁnancial
schemes, the current recommendation is to opt for mandatory
mechanisms, either tax- or contribution-based (Nicholson et al.,
2015), as there is no evidence of the superiority of one over the
other (Bump, 2015). However, in most LMICs, the “recent switch
towards a health insurance model” (Fox and Reich, 2015, p. 406)
seems to be at stake, as is the case in Burkina Faso, where the
present study was conducted. This contextual adaptation is criti-
cally important especially for UHC funding, where the underlying
concepts are complex. Therefore, “reforms to move towards UHC
need to be planned very carefully” (WHO, 2013a, p. 14). UHC is ander the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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public health, and ﬁnancial aspects. This paper focuses on the
ﬁnancial perspective.
Ghana is often cited as an example in West Africa of progres-
sion toward UHC (Mills et al., 2012; Witter et al., 2013), even
though numerous challenges remain in terms of equity of
coverage (Akazili et al., 2014). Africans, especially francophone
populations, are quite critical of their governments' capacity and
will to deliver basic healthcare (Abiola et al., 2011). In some West
African countries, such as Senegal and Mali, health system per-
formance has stagnated or even decreased (Asunka, 2013). In
these conditions, public servants have refused to make ﬁnancial
contributions mandatory, so that governments have had to make
them optional, thereby jeopardizing the establishment of national
health insurance.
UHC in Burkina Faso is representative of francophone West
Africa in general. In 2010, only 0.5% of women and 1.5% of men
were covered by health insurance (INSD, 2011). Current health
system funding is fragmented and does not allow for cross-
subsidization among population segments (Ridde et al., 2014).
The 2011e2020 national health development plan (Plan national
de developpement sanitaire - PNDS) aims to increase the public
health budget and to implement strategies for moving toward
UHC (Zett and Bationo, 2011). Decision-makers have identiﬁed
several challenges related to the ﬁnancial aspects of UHC,
including a reduced tax base, low political will and governance
issues, low contributive capacity of households, and problems in
administering health insurance (Zida et al., 2010). A parliamentary
workshop held in September 2014 ﬁnalized a bill concerning UHC
strategies. This bill, scheduled for parliamentary debate in
October 2014 (Gouvernement du Burkina Faso, 2013; Siribie and
Badiel, 2014), was ﬁnally adopted in September 2015 by the Na-
tional Transitional Council. It stipulates that coverage will be
conditional on an (eventually mandatory) contribution, to be set
according to each household's capacity. Operational issues such as
the healthcare package and third-party payment will be set by
decrees (Ministere de la fonction publique du travail et de la
securite sociale, 2014). A three-year pilot program will be con-
ducted to evaluate different funding models and care packages
(WHO, 2014).
The ﬁnancial principles underlying UHC sustainability and
solidarity are threefold: 1) contribution by anticipation (with or
without smoothing) of potential future risk (in our case, adopting
a household budget management approach that included antic-
ipating risks, rather than pre-payment, which had not yet been
implemented); 2) risk sharing (cross-subsidization of those in
need of healthcare), with non-refundable contributions that only
beneﬁt healthcare users; and 3) socio-economic status solidarity,
referring to cross-subsidization among different socio-economic
status (SES) levels, with larger contributions from those who
are better off ﬁnancially (Goudge et al., 2012). Very little is
known in Africa about population endorsement of UHC ﬁnancial
principles during early stages of strategy implementation, as is
the case in Burkina Faso. As far as we know, only Goudge et al.
(2012) have addressed this question, in the contexts of
Tanzania, Ghana, and South Africa. To attain UHC goals, WHO
strongly encourages academics to improve knowledge in this
area (WHO, 2013b). The present study was conducted within this
context of knowledge needs at the national and international
levels. Its objectives were twofold: 1) to measure population
endorsement of the three UHC ﬁnancial principles, and 2) to
discern which management conﬁgurations (e.g. which in-
stitutions and implementation levels) would achieve the greatest
adherence among the population as strategies are implemented
to move toward UHC.2. Methodology
Because health system funding, population exposure to health
insurance concepts, and decision-makers’ preoccupations are
different in Burkina Faso than in the countries studied by Goudge
et al. (2012), their methodological approach needed to be adapt-
ed to our study context. Additionally, an important limitation of
Goudge et al.’s (2012) study is that it considered only prospective
measures (‘hypothetical scenarios’). Especially in the African
context, however, desirability bias (Boutin, 1997) may strongly
affect results of surveys on such a complex and sensitive issue. We
addressed this concern by reporting responses to both prospective
questions (indicating willingness) and retrospective questions
(actual practices), to strengthen response reliability.
Our study is a variant of sequential exploratory design (instru-
ment development design) (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). In a
ﬁrst (qualitative) step, we adapted an instrument proposed by
Goudge et al. (2012) to Burkina Faso. Then, in a second (quantita-
tive) step, we incorporated this adapted instrument to measure
endorsement of UHC ﬁnancial principles within the speciﬁc
context.
2.1. Instrument adaptation (qualitative phase)
We interviewed representatives of ﬁnancial services to house-
holds, to beneﬁt from their experience in communicating with and
educating the local population, and to adapt the vocabulary and
explanation of the complex concepts involved in this study to the
local context. Nine heads of community-based health insurance
(CBHI e mutuelle de sante) schemes, two heads of micro-ﬁnance
institutions (MFIs), and a representative from the national CBHI
network (Reseau d'appui aux mutuelles de sante - RAMS) were
interviewed individually.
We then set up focus groups to: 1) assess people's compre-
hension of the concepts by having participants illustrate themwith
examples from everyday life, which then were used to develop
corresponding vignettes in the questionnaire, and 2) test graphic
illustrations to be used in the questionnaire for choosing preferred
scenarios of SES solidarity. Focus groups were stratiﬁed by area
(rural vs. urban), household SES (high, middle, and low), and
gender (household heads and inﬂuential spouses separately) to
capture diversity of activities and practices, as well as potential
divergences in their understanding of the abstract concepts
involved. In total, 68 people participated in 12 groups of four to six
people (except for one group with nine women). The results were
subjected to thematic analysis.
2.2. Household survey (quantitative phase)
The households sample was drawn from an annual cohort that
had already been observed over a three-year period in two districts
of central Burkina Faso: Kaya and Zorgho (Druetz et al., 2015). The
Kaya district was selected due to the presence of the Kaya Health
and Demographic Surveillance System (HDSS), which follows
approximately 8000 households (around 50,000 individuals)
(Kouanda et al., 2013). Zorgho is a comparable district, with the
exception that there is no fee exemption intervention in place, as
there is in Kaya. In both districts, households were randomly
sampled from the cohort, while ensuring an equal distribution by
area typedhalf urban, half rural. We then interviewed each
household head along with the most inﬂuential spouse (as deter-
mined by the household head's responses to the series of questions
beginning with, “Who ﬁnds moneywhen savings are insufﬁcient to
deal with unexpected expenses regarding …”). Our sample con-
sisted of 1255 respondents from 619 households.
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management
The questionnaire included questions on the three UHC ﬁnancial
principles, on management of UHC strategies, and on respondents'
proﬁles (demographic, SES, and exposure to ﬁnancial tools such as a
Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), microﬁnance, or
CBHI).
Given the population's low exposure to insurance principles and
the personal sensitivity of the concepts, we strengthened reliability
by including both retrospective and prospective questions. For each
principle being explored, we asked about both recent practice and
hypothetical cases, illustrated by vignettes describing in a detailed
and meaningful way the attributes and principles to be explored
(see Appendix 1).
Anticipation was measured retrospectively by asking whether
respondents had any savings strategy to cope with unexpected
health spending. We also investigated smoothing by asking
whether precautionary savings or reimbursement for health ex-
penses weremade once a year, a few times a year, ormore regularly.
For a prospective measure, respondents were also asked whether
they considered anticipatory (non-refundable) mandatory health
insurance contributions to be a problem or an advantage.
Risk sharing was measured both retrospectively, based on re-
spondents' actual practices of donating and lending in response to
solicitations for assistance (in line with the social relationship be-
tween the person asking and the one solicited), and prospectively,
by asking who should receive help from the respondent to cover
health costs.
Representation of solidarity across SES levels was measured by
having respondents choose among four scenarios of contribution
distribution. Three SES levels were illustrated by corresponding
housing and vehicle types, with different versions for urban and
rural areas. Each scenario presented how the three SES levels
should contribute. The number of chickens (the usual savings
strategy) that each SES level would have to contribute varied by
scenario, but the total contribution remained the same: 60 chickens
(see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3) for examples of scenario illus-
trations). In the ﬁrst scenario, each household contributed the same
amount regardless of household SES. In the second, each house-
hold's contribution was proportional to its income (e.g. each paid
10%). In the third, contributions were progressive, so that higher
SES households paid a higher fraction of their income than did
those with lower SES (e.g. 5% for the lowest SES level, 10% for the
middle level, and 15% for the highest). In the fourth, contributions
were also progressive, but the poorest were exempt.
For each administrative level (village, municipality, district, re-
gion, central government), respondents were asked whether they
would agree to implement universal health insurance. The highestTable 1
Retrospective and prospective measures of the three UHC ﬁnancial principles and mana
UHC principle Retrospective measures P
Anticipation
(and
smoothing)
Practices adopted to anticipate large health expenses and
smoothing of savings or reimbursement for own health
expenses
O
a
Risk sharing Practices of donation or loan as an answer to solicitations
to pay health expenses
O
m
SES solidarity Practices not measured but scenario illustrations based on
current practice of precautionary savings strategies
O
p
UHC
Management
Retrospective measures P
Management
level
Not applicable H
Trust Not applicable Taccepted administrative level was derived from these responses. To
measure the relative degree of conﬁdence in various institutions'
ability to manage health insurance, respondents were asked to rank
nine types of institution from one (trustworthiest) to nine (least
trustworthy). We used this ranking to assign a grade to each
institution: eight points for ﬁrst place, seven for second place, and
so on, with no points for the last place.
Table 1 summarizes how endorsement of the three UHC ﬁnan-
cial principles and management preferences were measured.2.4. Proﬁle of respondents
To study the potential effects of SES on endorsement of the three
principles and on preferences regarding UHC management,
households were assigned an essential needs satisfaction score
based on self-assessment on 40 items (Mpatswenumugabo et al.,
2007) and grouped into ﬁve quintiles based on their scores.
The essential needs score was constructed in four phases. First,
three focus groups (household heads from rural and urban areas
and surveyors who knew the region well) were organized to
determine what were considered essential needs in Burkina. Sec-
ond, the items identiﬁed were compared to those used in the UNDP
study in Niger and were found to be very similar; they could be
classiﬁed into the following categories: food safety, health, educa-
tion, clothing, housing, durable goods, animals, agriculture equip-
ment, other (safety, social network, etc.). Third, households were
asked, in a questionnaire, whether they were able to meet these
needs and whether they considered them essential. Lastly, the
households' scores were built by weighting each need according to
the proportion of households that considered it essential
(Mpatswenumugabo et al., 2007).
As the UHC principles under study are highly related to house-
hold ﬁnancial management, we assessed respondents' exposure to
ﬁnancial tools to take into account its potential effect on adherence.
This exposure was measured through the strength of their link
with: 1) a CBHI scheme; 2) a microﬁnance institution; and 3) a
Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA). The list of ﬁnan-
cial structures was established based on preliminary identiﬁcation
work performed in the area. When respondents reported being
located in a community with one of the three ﬁnancial structures,
one point was attributed; when a relative or friend was a member,
three points were attributed; and, when the respondents them-
selves were members, six points were attributed, up to a maximum
of 30 points (if the respondent was a member of all three schemes,
was located in a community with all three schemes, and had a
friend/member in all of them). Respondents were then grouped
into four balanced categories based on their ﬁnancial exposure
score: none, low, moderate, and high.gement preferences.
rospective measures
pinion on anticipatory mandatory contributions (whether a problem or an
dvantage).
pinion on help that should be given to the less healthy and received from the
ore healthy to pay health expenses
pinion about help that should be given to the poor and received from the less
oor to pay health expenses þ scenarios on contribution distribution by SES level
rospective measures
ighest administrative level of UHC management approved
rust score based on institution ranking
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Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, and frequency)
are presented in Table 2 and Fig. 2. Regressions of the main vari-
ables measuring the three principles against the respondent proﬁle
are presented in Table 3. Ordered logit analysis was used for or-
dered categorical variables (contribution scenario preferences) and
logit analysis for dummy variables (all the remaining variables of
interest). Marginal effects (Greene, 2012) were reported and the
reference modality (the lowest one) for each categorical variable
was indicated in parentheses.
The data on solicitation for health expense assistance were
rearranged so that one observation corresponded to one deci-
sion for each type of help seeker. This allowed us to include the
social link between the help seeker and respondent in the
regression.
The violation of independent observations hypothesis applies to
all data, as spouses were interviewed in the same household, and
even more so to the rearranged data, as eight decisions per
respondent are included. This is taken into account in the var-
ianceecovariance matrix structure by including household clusters
in regressions 1, 2, and 7, and two-way clusters (households and
respondents) in regressions 3 to 6. Robust standard errors are re-
ported (Cameron et al., 2006).Table 2
Descriptive statistics: adherence to the three principles and UHC management.
R: retrospective measures; P: prospective measures
Principle 1: Anticipation and smoothing of health expenses
R: Anticipation of large unexpected health expenses
Have an anticipation strategy to cope with large unexpected health expenses
Number of strategies adopted to cope with large unexpected health expenses
R: Saving or timing requests to cope with large unexpected health expenses
Saving a little at time without knowing if a health expense will occur
Saving all at once when a major money inﬂow occurs without knowing of an expen
Borrowing when an expense arises and repaying a little at time afterward
Borrowing when an expense arises and repaying when a major money inﬂow occur
Requesting help when a health expense occurs
P: Anticipatory and non-refundable contribution to UHC seen as an advantage
Principle 2: Risk sharing
R & P: See Fig. 2 for responses to solicitations to pay health expenses
P: I should help people who incur health expenses more often than I do
P: People who incur health expenses less often than I do should help me
Principle 3: SES solidarity
P: I should help people poorer than me to pay their health expenses
P: People less poor than me should help pay my health expenses
P: Preferred distribution of the contribution
Same amount (regardless the income)
Proportional to income
Progressive, paid by all
Progressive, exempting indigents
Implementation: Health coverage management
P: Highest management level accepted
Neighborhood
Sector (urban area)/Village (rural area)
Communal
Provincial
Regional
National
P: Trust level (score) to manage UCH funds
Village committee (CVD)
Health center community management committee (COGES)
City hall (municipal)
District
Central government
Association
NGO
Microﬁnance institution (MFI)
CBHI (Mutual health organization)
Observations3. Ethical approval
This study was approved by the health research ethics com-
mittees of Burkina Faso and of the University of Montreal Hospital
Research Centre (2012-11-85 and 12.273). Each respondent
enrolled and signed a consent form after being informed of the
objectives and consequences of the study. No compensation was
given for participating in the study.
4. Results
4.1. Proﬁle of respondents
Of our respondents, 54.7% were residents of Kaya, 48.7% were
urban dwellers, and 50.7% were women. The distribution of re-
spondents among the ﬁnancial exposure levels (none, low, mod-
erate, and high) was 23.4%, 21.0%, 26.6%, and 28.9% respectively.
Two-thirds (66.3%) had no education at all, 12.4% were literate
thanks to a literacy program, 13.6% had a primary education, and
7.7% had a secondary or higher education, although instances of
higher education were extremely rare. The average age of re-
spondents was 43.6 years. The proportions of respondents cohab-
iting with a household member with chronic disease or with a
physical or mental handicap were 18.5% and 17.8%, respectively.Mean Std. Dev. N
0.948 0.222 1190
3.891 2.108 4883
0.758 0.428 950
se 0.379 0.485 475
0.378 0.485 474
s 0.231 0.421 289
0.460 0.499 577
0.986 0.119 1237
0.997 0.056 1251
0.990 0.101 1242
1.000 0.000 1255
0.996 0.063 1250
0.028 0.165 35
0.231 0.422 290
0.358 0.480 449
0.383 0.486 481
0.010 0.097 12
0.037 0.188 46
0.032 0.176 40
0.011 0.105 14
0.004 0.063 5
0.907 0.291 1138
3.090 1.923
3.129 2.230
3.323 1.830
3.601 2.028
5.588 2.212
5.891 1.934
6.332 2.113
6.680 1.936
7.331 2.041
1255
Fig. 1. Frequency of income inﬂow to the household.
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Anticipation was very widespread, as 94.8% of respondents had
adopted at least one strategy to cope with large unexpected health
expenses, with 3.89 different strategies adopted on average per
household. When no strategy was adopted, the main reason was
lack of resources. When anticipation occurred, precautionary sav-
ings were mostly accumulated progressively (75.8%) rather than all
at once on the occasion of a major inﬂow of money (37.9%).
Smoothing occurred afterward as well, with 37.8% of respondents
having repaid their borrowing progressively, while 23.1% repaid it
at once. Nonetheless, saving and borrowing were largely com-
plemented by donations (46%). For 98.6% of respondents, antici-
patory (non-refundable) mandatory contributions were seen as an
advantage rather than a problem. The logit regression revealed no
difference in anticipation among wealth quintiles, but a higher
likelihood of anticipation in Zorgho and a higher likelihood of
smoothing anticipation in urban areas, when ﬁnancial exposure
was high or when respondents were younger.
The prevalence of smoothing practices would seem to advocate
for spreading out contributions. However, income inﬂow occurred
only a few times a year (i.e., infrequently) for 72% of the lowest SES
households (Q1), as well as for more than half (53%) of the highest
(Q5) (Fig. 1). Frequent income (monthly, several times a month, or
each market day) was much less common, occurring mainly among
the highest SES levels.74.7%
51.5%
33.1%
23.8%
0.3%
6.4%
18.3%
44.9%
98.4%
94.3% 91.9%
70.2%
99.5% 99.6% 99.5% 98.2%
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Fig. 2. Risk sharing: retrospective and prospective4.3. Risk sharing (cross-subsidization between healthy and ill
people)
The strongest and most signiﬁcant characteristic related to the
likelihood of respondents being solicited by others and of helping
them, both retrospectively and prospectively, was the strength of
respondents' social bond with the help seeker. Retrospectively, the
closer the link, the more likely it was that solicitations were made
and were met by a donation rather than a loan. From closest to
farthest, social links included offspring (closest), spouses, siblings
and parents, other members of the family, friends, neighbors, other
villagers, and ﬁnally others from outside (farthest). Respondents'
prospective willingness to help offspring, spouse, siblings, and
parents was similar, but decreased with geographical distance
when the help seeker was not part of the close family.
Regression analysis revealed that only the highest quintile (Q5)
was more likely to respond to solicitations with donations. Pro-
spectively, no linear effect was observed among quintiles. Financial
exposure was strongly associated with frequency of solicitations,
responding to solicitations by lending (rather than outright dona-
tion), and prospective willingness to help.
Respondents with a disabled person in the household were
more likely to be solicited and to help through donations rather
than loans. They were particularly more solicited by offspring, who
were probably the disabled people in the householdda hypothesis
we were unable to conﬁrm without proﬁle data on household
members, which was not part of our questionnaire.4.4. SES solidarity (cross-subsidization between wealth levels)
Extremely high endorsement of solidarity between SES levels
was declared in both directions. Respondents showed a clear
preference for progressivity: 2.8% would opt for uniform contri-
butions regardless of household wealth, 23.1% for contributions
proportional to household income, 35.8% for progressive contri-
butions by all, and 38.3% for progressive contributions with ex-
emptions for indigents. The ordered logit considered the four
scenarios, following a natural order from themost regressive (equal
contribution) to the most progressive (progressive with exemp-
tions). No signiﬁcant difference was observed in terms of prefer-
ences among quintiles. Urban residents favored progressivity.18.6%
13.5%
6.9% 5.7%
68.1% 66.2%
55.2%
46.7%
49.6%
41.0%
26.7%
18.9%
95.6% 95.9% 93.4% 92.1%
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responses to solicitations for health expenses.
Table 3
Regressions: adherence to the three principles by respondents' proﬁle.
Marginal effects reported Principle 1 Principle 2 Principle 3
Anticipate big
health expense
Smooth
anticipation
Have been
solicited
Loaned
(if solicited)
Gave
(if solicited)
Would help
(prospective)
Contribution
distribution
Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Ord. Logit
Quintile (Q1)
Q2 0.00242
(0.0201)
0.0448
(0.0369)
0.00566
(0.0208)
0.00438
(0.0241)
0.0244
(0.0256)
0.0306***
(0.00935)
0.00491
(0.00661)
Q3 0.0278
(0.0192)
0.0476
(0.0377)
0.0384*
(0.0218)
0.0349
(0.0263)
0.0520**
(0.0239)
0.0361***
(0.00903)
0.00926
(0.00644)
Q4 0.0252
(0.0209)
0.0115
(0.0372)
0.00900
(0.0215)
0.0404
(0.0256)
0.0350
(0.0266)
0.0266***
(0.00993)
0.000365
(0.00726)
Q5 0.0337
(0.0206)
0.0342
(0.0396)
0.0389*
(0.0214)
0.0142
(0.0252)
0.0636***
(0.0241)
0.0150
(0.0118)
0.00629
(0.00692)
Kaya 0.0746***
(0.0172)
0.0517*
(0.0268)
0.0928***
(0.0140)
0.148***
(0.0179)
0.0797***
(0.0181)
0.0358***
(0.00747)
0.00669
(0.00452)
Urban 0.00528
(0.0133)
0.0981***
(0.0251)
0.00220
(0.0138)
0.0310*
(0.0173)
0.0533***
(0.0163)
0.00455
(0.00626)
0.0131***
(0.00463)
Women 0.0101
(0.0146)
0.0601**
(0.0274)
0.0941*** 0.0193
(0.0171)
0.0337*
(0.0185)
0.00328
(0.00672)
0.0124**
(0.00491)(0.0155)
Financial exposure (None)
Low 0.000243
(0.0219)
0.0470
(0.0379)
0.0380**
(0.0180)
0.0717***
(0.0272)
0.0180
(0.0274)
0.0402***
(0.0105)
0.00844*
(0.00496)
Moderate 0.0110
(0.0201)
0.0354
(0.0358)
0.0759***
(0.0178)
0.0763***
(0.0230)
0.00934
(0.0222)
0.0415***
(0.00919)
0.0104*
(0.00624)
High 0.0326*
(0.0188)
0.127***
(0.0344)
0.0999***
(0.0195)
0.0731***
(0.0232)
0.000744
(0.0236)
0.0379***
(0.0104)
0.00524
(0.00595)
Chronic disease in household 0.00925
(0.0164)
0.0725**
(0.0298)
0.0214
(0.0156)
0.000447
(0.0213)
0.00839
(0.0224)
0.00620
(0.00970)
0.00819
(0.00532)
Handicap in household 0.0151
(0.0176)
0.0278
(0.0307)
0.0662***
(0.0166)
0.00705
(0.0197)
0.0470**
(0.0214)
0.0290**
(0.0120)
0.00994*
(0.00547)
Education (None)
Literate 0.0207
(0.0177)
0.0971***
(0.0325)
0.0225
(0.0196)
0.0742***
(0.0250)
0.0311
(0.0238)
0.00640
(0.00903)
0.0155*
(0.00792)
Primary 0.0353**
(0.0150)
0.0310
(0.0370)
0.0372*
(0.0208)
0.0385*
(0.0222)
0.0192
(0.0206)
0.00723
(0.0114)
0.00203
(0.00564)
Sec. or higher 0.0272
(0.0210)
0.0315
(0.0487)
0.00491
(0.0243)
0.0713***
(0.0238)
0.0314
(0.0267)
0.00697
(0.0109)
0.0236**
(0.0116)
Age 0.000394
(0.000519)
0.00284***
(0.000953)
0.00126**
(0.000547)
5.70e-05
(0.000689)
0.000993
(0.000703)
6.58e-05
(0.000228)
0.000218
(0.000166)
Help seeker (offspring)
Spouse(s) 0.231***
(0.0142)
0.0694***
(0.0103)
0.0430***
(0.00841)
0.000829
(0.00152)
Siblings or parents 0.414***
(0.0158)
0.179***
(0.0178)
0.0683***
(0.0128)
0.000235
(0.00275)
Other family members 0.507*** 0.432*** 0.287*** 0.0128***
Friends (0.0159)
0.611***
(0.0250)
0.629***
(0.0250)
0.583***
(0.00415)
0.0353***
Neighbors (0.0145)
0.561***
(0.0303)
0.657***
(0.0343)
0.518***
(0.00572)
0.0377***
Others from the village (0.0153)
0.678***
(0.0290)
0.534***
(0.0308)
0.725***
(0.00586)
0.0600***
Others outside (0.0135)
0.690***
(0.0365)
0.497***
(0.0393)
0.783***
(0.00693)
0.0719***
Observations 1255 1253 (0.0133)
10,040
(0.0356)
3040
(0.0355)
3040
(0.00722)
10,040
1255
Household clusters included in regressions 1, 2 and 7, and two-way (households and respondents) clusters in regressions 3 to 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Concerning the highest level at which respondents would
approve of UHC being implemented (as described in the vignettes),
90.7% indicated the national level, 3.7% the sector or village level,
and 3.2% the municipal level (just above sector or village). Very few
chose the neighborhood, provincial, or regional levels (1% or less
per option).
The CBHI scheme was ranked as the trustworthiest type of
institution (highest score) for managing UHC funds, followed by
local organizations such as microﬁnance institutions (MFIs), NGOs,and associations. Only after these came the central government, the
district (local representation of the central government), or the city
hall. Least trusted were community organizations such as CVDs
(village development committees) and COGESs (management
committees of health centers).5. Discussion
5.1. Normative answers or commitment?
For each principle, both retrospective and prospective questions
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introduced by prospective questions about future UHC. Indeed, for
each of the principles some prospective questions revealed a very
high level of endorsement. Near-unanimity was found in: 1)
considering the mandatory aspect to be a positive advantage; 2)
agreeing to help others who are less healthy; and 3) agreeing to
help pay healthcare costs for those who are poorer. Even though
respondents' actual practices showed that anticipation and risk
sharing are a reality in everyday life, the results described above
should probably be taken to represent normative answers rather
than an actual commitment. Similar discrepancies have been well
documented among street level workers in West Africa questioned
about public policies implementation (Olivier de Sardan, 2013;
Ridde, 2008), but lay people's views were less documented.
Indeed, real-life conditions are complex, and several issues
around governance, corruption, and trust need to be tackled prior
to implementing UHC (Abiola et al., 2011; Gilson, 2003; Mladovsky,
2014). Awareness-raising and education regarding UHC (by those
responsible for communicating with the public) are also necessary.
Nevertheless, our ﬁnding that endorsement of the three principles
is quite high is very encouraging for UHC strategies implementa-
tion, given that social homogeneity and cohesion are determinants
of UHC success (McKee et al., 2013).
One might expect the highest SES level to display less solidarity
and to be reluctant to endorse the most progressive contribution
distribution scenarios, as found in other sub-Saharan African
countries by Goudge et al. (2012). Anthropological studies in the
region show that solidarity is disintegrating and is limited to close
social networks, thus leaving out people without social and eco-
nomic capital (Roth, 2010; Vuarin, 1994). Nonetheless, we found no
signiﬁcant difference in preferences among SES levels. Although
the qualitative phase of our study validated the relevance of our
drawings illustrating the different levels of wealth, the survey was
conducted outside of the capital (Ouagadougou) in which the
country's elite is concentrated. We cannot presume that the
wealthiest residents of that city would have been so favorable to
progressive contributions.
5.2. Anticipation
Precautionary saving is strongly rooted in everyday practices.
We speciﬁcally asked people what anticipatory strategies they
adopted to ensure their precautionary savings could indeed be used
for health expenses. Because such savings are used to deal with the
ﬁrst shock that arises, if unplanned expenses are ﬁrst incurred for a
shock that is not health-related, resources may no longer be
available. UHC contributions would dedicate resources to health
shocks and thereby obviate this risk of competing shocks.
Furthermore, compared to other shocks, health shocks are more
frequent, affect the poorest the most, and require more adaptation
within households (Mazumdar et al., 2014; Wagstaff and Lindelow,
2014).
A commonly heard explanation for low adherence to CBHI
schemes in Burkina Faso or Benin is that people are afraid having a
dedicated contribution will attract health problems (De Allegri
et al., 2006; Turcotte-Tremblay et al., 2013). This argument does
not seem to hold, as our respondents showed a high level of
anticipation in practice. Furthermore, willingness to anticipate does
not appear to be an obstacle to future UHC. Rather, a much more
relevant concern is distrust of institutions (compromised by cor-
ruption, public ﬁnances mismanagement, poor governance, impu-
nity) and of their integrity when it comes to managing UHC
contributions for their intended purposes (Bationo, 2013; De Allegri
et al., 2006; Mladovsky et al., 2015; Mladovsky et al., 2014; Ridde
et al., 2010; Schneider, 2005).5.3. Risk sharing
Both reported practices and prospective opinions indicated that
risk sharing for expenses resulting from health shocks was widely
accepted among our sample population. This ﬁnding is in line with
results of experimental studies reported by the World Bank (World
Bank, 2015), which concluded that people around the world
generally prefer to cooperatedconditional upon others also coop-
eratingdthan to behave individualistically. Moreover, the strength
of social bonds is the most important determinant of the type of
response to solicitations for assistance. Thus, social norms seem to
be much more important than level of wealth in determining what
kind of help is requested and provided.
In the ﬁnancial exposure index we constructed, respondents
with higher exposure were those with stronger links to micro-
ﬁnance institutions, ROSCAs, and/or CBHI schemes. Their higher
propensity to lend when solicited could have been interpreted as a
sign of greater solidarity if their propensity to donate had been
higher as well. However, such was not the case. A possible expla-
nation is that this group is more tightly integrated into a ﬁnancial
network where help through loans is, on one hand, associated with
stronger guarantees through peer pressure (Ghatak and Guinnane,
1999; Li et al., 2013; van Bastelaer and Leathers, 2006) and, on the
other, more likely to be rewarded by reciprocal help when needed
(Defourny and Failon, 2011). These twomechanisms strengthen the
incentive to lend.
5.4. UHC management
The great majority of respondents identiﬁed the national level
as the highest acceptable level for UHC implementation. At the
same time, they identiﬁed local institutions as most trustworthy for
UHC management. This may seem contradictory at ﬁrst glance, but
can be explained by the difference in the essential issues addressed
by these two questions. The ﬁrst has to do with the notion of na-
tional solidarity, whereas the second reﬂects (mis)trust in central
government per se. Given this ﬁnding, local or regional organiza-
tion coupled with a federal structure at the national level might be
an interesting avenue to explore. It would also offer the advantages
of a re-insurance mechanism (Waelkens and Criel, 2007).
Willingness to accept UHC implementation at the national level
is an encouraging start, and respondents' perceptions regarding the
appropriate management level seem to be aligned in principle with
experts' recommendations. Although corruption is on the rise in
Burkina Faso, it is perceived as an issue to be dealt with rather than
one to be accepted with fatalism (Bationo, 2013; CGD, 2013). The
distrust expressed by our respondents with respect to the central
government and its local representatives shows how critical an
adequate and trustworthy management of UHC funds would be to
achieving real adherence. For instance, delays in reimbursements
by the central government have undermined trust in the case of
user fees exemption in West African countries (Meessen et al.,
2011; Ridde et al., 2012).
Furthermore, although the national level seems to be preferred
for UHC implementation, current solidarity practices are focused on
close family and, to a lesser extent, on friends and neighbors. Few
solicitations are received from more distant people, who are less
frequently helped. Thus, if national UHC is implemented, contri-
bution levels should be set so that coverage is provided for entire
families.
To separate the risk sharing principle from quality of care issues,
we speciﬁed in our prospective questions that, even though the
hypothetical contribution would depend on each contributor's
wealth status, the quality of care would be the same for all (see last
vignette in Appendix 1). If, however, the overall quality of care in
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very reassuring, and the acceptability of the three principles
demonstrated above could easily be jeopardized, especially the
mandatory and redistributive aspects.
Finally, we observed a discrepancy between income inﬂow and
smoothing practices (see Fig. 1), which suggests to us that a wide
range of options should be offered for the timing of UHC contri-
butions, rather than just a choice between a one-time payment or
installment payments.
5.5. Methodological limitations
Our study sample was embedded in a larger cohort whose
wealth was measured using the essential needs index, an appro-
priate tool for classifying households by wealth, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, where the informal sector and self-production are
substantial. This method does not compute monetary ability-to-
pay, which would have been a key measurement in a willingness-
to-pay approach. Also, in our methodology, we deﬁned exposure
to ﬁnancial tools by combining exposure to CBHI, ROSCAs, and
microﬁnance, which are different mechanisms. Given the limited
ﬁnancial literacy of our study population, our goal was simply to
capture exposure to such tools, regardless of the ﬁnancial mecha-
nism. CBHI is not widespread enough in our context to be consid-
ered alone. Finally, with regard to the practice of loans and
donations, it is possible that these could have been motivated by
clientelism rather than real solidarity.
Given their distrust linked to negative past experiences with
CBHI in Africa, potential enrollees are likely to wait and see how
CBHI is evolving prior to enrolling (De Allegri et al., 2006; Defourny
and Failon, 2011; Oriakhi et al., 2012). One unexpected ﬁnding of
this survey was the high level of trust in CBHI schemes to manage
UHC. At ﬁrst glance, this is inconsistent with our population's low
level of CBHI knowledge and enrolment. However, this ﬁnding may
be the result of confusion in the vocabulary used in our question-
naire. At the very beginning, in assessing knowledge about CBHIs
(called mutuelles in French), we introduced the notion for the ﬁrst
time to respondents who had no prior exposure. The questionnaire
presented the UHC principles one by one through vignettes, by
giving everyday examples and explaining that UHC would be, in
essence, like a giant mutuelle. If knowledge of this institution had
been more widespread among the population, it might have pro-
vided a good teaching tool to help people imagine how UHC would
be, but given that very few of them knew about CBHIs, the use of
the term mutuelle in the vignettes probably generated confusion
more than it helped. In retrospect, the CBHI option in the question
on institutional trust should have read “UHC-dedicated adminis-
tration.” Given the high preference for this institution indicated by
the responses, however, we cannot discount the potential bias
created by our choice of vocabulary in the questionnaire.
6. Conclusion
Given that the UHC ﬁnancial principles were widely endorsed
within our sample, UHC implementation should not be expected to
encounter any obstacles in terms of acceptance by citizens. None-
theless, certain critical conditions must be met to make UHC
ﬁnancial principles a reality.
First, if contributors trust the mechanism from the outset, they
are more likely to collaborate and, in turn, to encourage others to
collaborate, ultimately resulting in an inclusive virtuous equilib-
rium. Second, contributions must be mandatory. Third, public edu-
cation and communication are powerful tools for improving
adherence, especially in countries where exposure to insurance
principles is quite low. Fourth, while the concept of progressivityseems well accepted, determining and enforcing fair contribution
levels nevertheless represent huge implementation challenges,
given the substantial size of the informal sector. Finally, public
health funding remains very low. In a recent study of 43 African
countries, only 12 had allocated internal resources of at least $60
per person, which is the minimum amount required for a basic
healthcare package (Avila et al., 2013).
Discussion on UHC strategies funding should guide policy
makers towardmore universal healthcare systems. Providing larger
and more equitable healthcare systems would improve coverage
and access, with positive consequences for population health
(Moreno-Serra and Smith, 2015). The current political upheavals in
Burkina Faso, which began in late 2014, may provide a window of
opportunity for promoting greater and more equitable public UHC
funding, as exists in other countries (McKee et al., 2013; Savedoff
et al., 2012). Political will alone, however, is insufﬁcient. Civil so-
ciety, professionals, and the general public will have to be strongly
involved to ensure that “by 2030, everyone (100%) has coverage to
protect them from ﬁnancial risk,” as advocated by WHO and the
World Bank (WHO &World Bank, 2013).
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